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Abstract. - We show that strategy independent adaptations of random interaction networks
can induce powerful mechanisms, ranging from the Red Queen to group selection, that promote
cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas. These two mechanisms emerge spontaneously as
dynamical processes due to deletions and additions of links, which are performed whenever players
adopt new strategies and after a certain number of game iterations, respectively. The potency
of cooperation promotion, as well as the mechanism responsible for it, can thereby be tuned
via a single parameter determining the frequency of link additions. We thus demonstrate that
coevolving random networks may evoke an appropriate mechanism for each social dilemma, such
that cooperation prevails even by highly unfavorable conditions.
Introduction. – Social dilemmas constitute situa-
tions where the collective wellbeing is at odds with indi-
vidual success. Frequently studied within the framework
of evolutionary game theory [1], they provide some of the
most challenging environments for the sustenance of coop-
erative behavior. As successors of evolutionary games on
regular grids [2–4], evolutionary games on complex net-
works have been the subject of intense investigations in
the last years [5], and their ability to promote or sustain
cooperative behavior in different types of social dilemmas
has often been confirmed [6–14]. Apart from some no-
table early exceptions [15, 16] the majority of these stud-
ies considered static interaction networks underlying the
main evolutionary process. The evolution on networks is,
however, increasingly often accompanied also by the evo-
lution of networks [17–26], and this not just in the context
of evolutionary game theory. Indeed, networks are to be
seen as evolving or adaptive entities that may substan-
tially influence any dynamical process that is taking place
on them [27].
Coevolutionary processes in general, i.e. processes that
happen alongside the main evolution of strategies, are cur-
rently in the focus of attention within evolutionary game
theory, and it has been shown that they may very effec-
tively promote cooperation (see e.g. [22,25,26]). Notably,
the subject of coevolution need not be the interaction net-
work, but the term may refer to the teaching activity and
related reproduction capability [28], or the ability of the
players to move on the spatial grid [29–31], as well. An im-
portant observation in many cases is that coevolutionary
rules may lead to highly heterogeneous states in a spon-
taneous manner [32]. Since heterogeneity has often been
found favorable for the evolution of cooperation [33, 34],
it is considered a key outcome of coevolutionary processes
that lead to enhanced levels of cooperation.
Here we aim to show that simple coevolutionary rules
affecting the interaction network may lead, not just to
heterogeneous states promoting the cooperative strategy,
but also to new dynamical processes that positively af-
fect the evolution of cooperation. In particular, we start
with a random interaction network and introduce a co-
evolutionary rule entailing both deletions of existing and
additions of new links between players. While existing
links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strat-
egy or its degree exceeds a threshold value, new links are
added after each given number τ of game iterations. The
latter parameter thus defines a time scale for the addi-
tion of new links, which may be tuned faster or slower
according to the deletion of existing links. Irrespective
of the time scale separation [35, 36] between them, the
counteraction of deletions and additions of links largely
preserves the initial random topology of the network and
its heterogeneity, so that the reported ability of resolv-
ing social dilemmas is due to the spontaneous emergence
of the Red Queen mechanism and group selection, which
appear spontaneously in dependence on τ and the social
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dilemma governing the evolution of the strategies. We
thus show that simple strategy independent coevolution-
ary rules may evoke appropriate dynamical mechanisms
that affect the adoption of strategies on the macroscopic
level of evolutionary games so that the governing social
dilemma is resolved in favor of the collective wellbeing.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows.
First, we describe the considered social dilemmas and the
protocol for the coevolution of random networks. Next
we present the results, whereas lastly we summarize and
discuss their implications.
Social dilemmas and setup. – In what follows we
consider all three major social dilemma types where play-
ers can choose either to cooperate or defect, whereby mu-
tual cooperation yields the reward R, mutual defection
leads to punishment P , and the mixed choice gives the co-
operator the sucker’s payoff S and the defector the temp-
tation T . Adopting previously introduced parametriza-
tion [12], thus designating R = 1 and P = 0 as fixed,
the remaining two payoffs can occupy −1 ≤ S ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ T ≤ 2, where if T > R > P > S we have the
prisoner’s dilemma game, T > R > S > P yields the
snowdrift and R > T > P > S the stag-hunt game. Ir-
respective of the governing social dilemma, initially each
player x is designated either as a cooperator (sx = C) or
defector (sx = D) with equal probability, and is placed
on a random network that is constructed from N indi-
viduals with an average degree kavg = 4. As usual, du-
plicate links are omitted. Evolution of the two strategies
is performed in accordance with the Monte Carlo simula-
tion procedure comprising the following elementary steps.
First, a randomly selected player x acquires its payoff px
by playing the game with all its kx neighbors. Next, one
randomly chosen neighbor of x, denoted by y, also ac-
quires its payoff py by playing the game with all its ky
neighbors. Last, if px > py player x tries to enforce its
strategy sx on player y in accordance with the probability
W (sx → sy) = (px − py)/bkq, where kq is the largest of
the two degrees kx and ky, as used before in case of het-
erogeneous interaction topologies [9,12,22]. In accordance
with the random sequential update, each player is selected
once on average during a full Monte Carlo step.
In addition to the evolution of the two strategies by each
considered social dilemma, a rule for the adaptation of ran-
dom interaction networks is implemented. First, whenever
player x adopts a new strategy all its links, except from
the one with the donor of the new strategy, are deleted.
This process of strategy adoption and simultaneous link
deletion is demonstrated schematically in Fig. 1. Hence, in
addition to adopting a new strategy, the player is forced to
break its connections to former allies and getting kx = 1.
Second, to counteract the depletion of links that consti-
tute the random network, all individuals are allowed to
form a new link with a randomly chosen player with which
they are not yet connected after every τ full Monte Carlo
steps. The latter process can be considered as aging, and
Fig. 1: Schematic presentation of the coevolutionary rule af-
fecting the interaction network. Player depicted by the black
circle passes strategy to its neighbor depicted by the white
circle. Consequently, the invaded player looses all its links, ex-
cept from the one with the donor of the new strategy. This is
marked by the dashed lines extending towards other neighbor-
ing players depicted by grey circles.
accordingly, as soon as kx reaches a threshold kmax, player
x dies and is replaced by a newborn having the same strat-
egy and keeping a single randomly selected link from its
predecessor, thus maintaining kx = 1. Within the current
work kmax was chosen large enough so as not to influence
the initial random topology of players. Below presented
results were obtained on networks hosting N = 104−2·105
players, for which kmax = 500 has proven to be sufficiently
large. It is worth mentioning that the coevolutionary pro-
cess affecting the interaction network may occasionally re-
sult in detached individual players that originally formed
the neighborhood of an invaded player. In such cases we
relinked the detached player randomly back onto the net-
work with a single connection. By maintaining the mini-
mal degree equal to one, we achieve that every player has
at least one neighbor at all times, which is a necessary
condition for playing the game and defining the fitness of
an individual. We also highlight that the proposed rule
for the adaptation of interaction networks is fully strat-
egy independent, and thus, on its own does not indirectly
support cooperators by treating C − C, C −D or D −D
links differently from one another. Next, we will system-
atically analyze the evolution of cooperation by τ = 1
and τ = 500 for all three social dilemma types. The two
considered values correspond to small and large time scale
separation between link deletions and additions, and as we
will show, largely affect the sustenance of the cooperative
strategy as well as the mechanisms responsible for it.
Results. – We start by presenting results obtained
for τ = 1 in Fig. 2, where the complete T − S phase di-
agram is presented. In the bottom right quadrant, where
the T > R > P > S ranking constitutes the prisoner’s
dilemma game, the cooperators can be sustained up to
T = 1.1 but only if S = 0, whereas for all S < −0.037 the
defectors dominate completely. Moving to the stag-hunt
game in the bottom left quadrant (R > T > P > S)
of Fig. 2, the sustenance of cooperators improves, yet
in both cases cooperation levels do not notably surpass
those that can be obtained on random networks in the
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Fig. 2: Full T − S phase diagram obtained for τ = 1. Solid
red lines denote the borders between full cooperator dominance
(C phase), full defector dominance (D phase), and the mixed
states (C +D phase). Dotted blue line in the snowdrift quad-
rant (upper right) denotes the border of oscillatory solutions
(O phase). We further examine this quadrant along the dash-
dotted black line using the common r parametrization (see text
for details). Dashed green lines depict borders between the so-
cial dilemma types. Note that the dominance of cooperators
in the upper left quadrant is trivial since T ≤ 1 and S ≥ 0
simultaneously.
absence of coevolutionary rules (see e.g. Fig. 2 in [12]).
Indeed, the most interesting features can be observed in
the upper right quadrant, where besides complete cooper-
ator dominance for low enough T , there exist a broad re-
gion of mixed C +D states including oscillatory solutions
(marked with O). Evidently, the dynamical adaptations
of the random network can sustain cooperators across the
whole snowdrift quadrant, which is a notable improvement
if compared to the case of static interaction networks.
Aiming to identify the mechanism behind the promo-
tion of cooperation, we analyze the evolutionary processes
in the upper right quadrant of Fig. 2 more accurately.
Without loosing generality we can introduce a single pa-
rameter r ∈ (0, 1) that determines the free payoff elements
as T = 1+r and S = 1−r [37]. Accordingly, the values of
r, constituting the dash-dotted diagonal in Fig. 2, charac-
terize the cost-to-benefit ratio of the snowdrift game [9].
In Fig. 3 we present the density of cooperators ρC along
r. Since the r diagonal cuts through the oscillatory so-
lutions (dotted blue region in Fig. 2), we plot in Fig. 3
minima and maxima of ρC for these particular values of r.
Following complete cooperator dominance up to r ∼= 0.41
and a rather sharp descent of ρC (region around arrow a),
the oscillatory solutions start via a second order continu-
ous phase transition at r ∼= 0.50. The amplitudes of these
oscillations are therefore initially modest (arrow b), but
increase fast beyond the transition point (arrow c). As
r increases further the oscillations terminate abruptly via
a first order discontinuous phase transition at r = 0.732
(arrow d), and again settle onto a stationary state. Tem-
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Fig. 3: Density of cooperators ρC in dependence on r (the dash-
dotted diagonal splitting the upper right quadrant in Fig. 2) for
τ = 1. Arrows mark sampling values of r for which temporal
curses of ρC are presented in Fig. 4. Note that by oscillatory
solutions, starting at r = 0.50 (arrow b) via a second order
continuous phase transition and ending at r = 0.732 (arrow
d) via a first order discontinuous phase transition, both the
minima and maxima of ρC are depicted. The vertical dashed
connecting lines at r = 0.732 indicate that these states are
unstable and transient either to the oscillatory or the steady
state solution [see Fig. 4(d) and the pertaining main text].
poral behaviors of ρC at these characteristic values of r
are depicted in Fig. 4.
From the dynamical point of view particularly notable
is Fig. 4(d), where the coexistence of steady state and os-
cillatory solutions, characteristic for some first order dis-
continuous phase transitions, is depicted. We note here
that the exact sequence of bifurcations is difficult to de-
termine in the absence of a low-dimensional model or the
use of coarse-graining techniques (see [38] for a related
study). The basin of attraction of the steady state so-
lution is caught if the initial value of ρC is close enough
to the stationary value (initially ρC = 0.6; dashed blue),
but otherwise the oscillatory solution is chosen (initially
ρC = 0.2; solid red). From the viewpoint of strategy evo-
lution, results presented in Figs. 3 and 4 outline a Red
Queen mechanism for the sustenance of cooperation in
the snowdrift game, similarly as has been reported previ-
ously if a third strategy, such as loners, was introduced
to evolutionary games (see e.g. [39,40]). Since oscillations
are possible only if the system has at least two indepen-
dent variables, presently the obvious candidate for the sec-
ond, first being ρC , is the network structure. Indeed, by
defining ρlk as the density of players whose degree belongs
to the lower class (e.g. k < (kmax/3)) and measuring it
in dependence on time, it can be verified that it changes
with the same oscillation frequency as ρC but a pi/2 phase
shift, as shown in Fig. 5. We thus argue that the tides of
cooperation are evoked by the emergence of robust coop-
erative clusters that can form around players having high
degree, similarly as reported previously for scale-free net-
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Fig. 4: Temporal evolutions of ρC for r corresponding to the
arrows in Fig. 3; (a) r = 0.42, (b) r = 0.50, (c) r = 0.64 and
(d) r = 0.732. In panel (d) the coexistence of a steady state
(dashed blue line) and the oscillatory solution (solid red line) at
the first order discontinuous phase transition is demonstrated
(see text for details).
works [9]. However, since according to the coevolutionary
rule the links of these players are dissolved as soon as
they reach kmax, the cooperative clusters disintegrate, in
turn enabling the defectors to win and thus resulting in
the downfall of ρC . Simultaneously, the density of players
having small(large) degree rises(falls), as evidenced by the
dashed blue line in Fig. 5. The process starts anew when
frequent additions of new links due to a low τ value tem-
porarily restore the difference between influential players
having degree close to kmax and the followers who have
comparatively low degree, thus inducing a new oscillation
cycle.
Remarkably, when the time scale separation between
link deletions and additions increases, the strength of co-
operation promotion also increases substantially, as evi-
denced in Fig. 6 obtained for τ = 500. Note that the
complete dominance of cooperators (ρC = 1) now spans
over an extensive T − S region, encompassing the entire
traditional snowdrift (0 ≤ r ≤ 1; see e.g. [9]) and weak
prisoner’s dilemma (1 ≤ T ≤ 2, R=1, P=S=0; see e.g. [2])
parametrization. Moreover, the stag hunt dilemma is re-
solved very satisfactory as well, with defectors dominating
only by extremely harsh conditions that are characterized
with high T and extensively negative S < −0.6. If com-
pared to results presented in Fig. 2 (τ = 1), the improve-
ment in terms of cooperation promotion in Fig. 6 is obvi-
ous, and it can also be observed that the mixed (C +D)
and oscillatory (O) phases vanish. We thus conclude that
the mechanism responsible for the promotion of coopera-
tion changes as well, which may be attributed to two cru-
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Fig. 5: Temporal evolutions of ρC (solid red line) and the den-
sity of players belonging to the low-degree class ρlk (dashed
blue line) obtained for r = 0.7 (equivalently T = 1.7 and
S = 0.3) and τ = 1. Note the anti-phase synchronization
between ρC and the fraction of players having small degree.
cial difference compared to the τ = 1 case. First, due to
the slower addition of new links the cooperative domains
can grow larger and stronger around players having high
degree since they prevail over longer periods of time, i.e.
the kmax threshold is not reached so fast. And second,
the slow additions of new links facilitate the emergence
of highly influential players, with comparatively very high
degrees if compared to the majority, to which the follow-
ers cannot catch up easily. These two facts result in a
transition from the Red Queen mechanism of cooperation
promotion by the snowdrift game and the predominantly
heterogeneity based promotion of cooperation in the pris-
oner’s dilemma and the stag hunt game at τ = 1, to a
powerful group selection mechanism that emerges by all
three social dilemmas for higher τ , as we will demonstrate
next.
Figure 7 shows temporal courses of ρC from the snow-
drift quadrant at r = 0.85 for increasing values of τ . Most
importantly, we point out the emergence of time intervals
during which ρC is constant. This cascade-like feature be-
comes increasingly pronounced as τ increases. Namely,
at τ = 1 (solid red line) and τ = 50 (dashed green line)
it is practically absent, whereas at τ = 500 (dash-dotted
black line) the cumulative duration of dormancy of ρC sur-
passes that of active phases. We argue that the reason for
the emergence of these time intervals of inactivity lies in
the introduced coevolutionary process, which if τ is suf-
ficiently large, meaning that new links are added slowly,
leads to the emergence of homogeneous and virtually iso-
lated groups of players. These groups remain inactive for
as long as it takes for the newly added links to recon-
nect them with one another, of which duration is roughly
equivalent to τ (see Fig. 7). It is important to note that
during the inactive phase there are practically no strat-
egy transfers taking place, and thus the main source of
p-4
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Fig. 6: Full T − S phase diagram obtained for τ = 500.
Solid red line denotes the sharp border between full cooperator
dominance (C phase) and full defector dominance (D phase).
Dashed green lines depict borders between the social dilemma
types.
link deletions is disabled. Consequently, the addition of
new links can gradually reconnect the detached groups,
which then again triggers an avalanche of strategy adop-
tions, which in turn starts the whole process again, until
an absorbing state is reached. Thus, the temporal plots
in Fig. 7 arguably evidence the spontaneous emergence of
group selection due to the introduction of the proposed
coevolutionary rule by high values of τ . Moreover, since
the slow additions of new links facilitate the emergence of
highly influential players, the cooperators flourish within
the isolated groups whereas defectors weaken. Note that
influential defectors are exposed to a negative feedback
effect that sets in as soon as the neighbors adopt the de-
fecting strategy. Then there is nobody left to exploit, and
such clusters become vulnerable to cooperators. Thus, as
soon as the two types of groups reestablish a sufficiently
strong interconnectedness, cooperators can successfully in-
vade the defectors, thereby gradually increasing the coop-
erative domains. The latter processes manifest as rather
steep jumps in the temporal traces of ρC by large enough
τ , which are then again followed by dormancy since the
many strategy adoptions anew lead to isolation of homo-
geneous groups of players and restart the outlined group
selection mechanism.
Summary. – In sum, we show that evolving random
networks constitute an optimal environment for the evolu-
tion of cooperation provided the time scale separation be-
tween the deletions and additions of links is large enough.
A powerful group selection mechanism then emerges spon-
taneously, which is able to warrant full cooperator domi-
nance across an extensive T − S region covering all major
types of social dilemmas. However, if the additions of
new links are frequent, the formation of isolated homoge-
neous groups is hindered and the sustenance of coopera-
tors relies either on the heterogeneity of random interac-
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Fig. 7: Temporal evolution of ρC at r = 0.85 (equivalently
T = 1.85 and S = 0.15) for τ = 1 (solid red line), τ = 50
(dashed green line), τ = 200 (dotted blue line) and τ = 500
(dash-dotted black line). Steps in the temporal evolution (time
intervals during which ρC is constant) that can be observed by
larger values of τ indicate the emergence of group selection in
the snowdrift game. Qualitatively identical results can also be
obtained for the other two considered social dilemma types.
tion networks, or as demonstrated for the snowdrift game,
on a Red Queen mechanism which emerges due to the
interplay between the oscillatory changes of the network
structure and the density of cooperators. The complexity
of this process is underlined by the first order discontin-
uous phase transition responsible for the termination of
the oscillatory phase that postulates coexistence of steady
state and oscillatory solutions which are chosen in depen-
dence on the initial conditions, thus indicating the option
of bistability in coevolutionary games. Notably, the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria has recently been reported also
for N -person stag hunt dilemmas [41], whereas oscillatory
solutions in the context of evolutionary games have been
presented in [42]. Simple strategy independent coevolu-
tionary rules, entailing both additions of new as well as
deletions of existing links, can thus favor cooperative be-
havior beyond the levels of static complex networks, and
seem to offer a rich plethora of mechanisms to tackle this
formidable challenge. Thereby processes such as making
new friends, punishment or aging, which may all account
for the adaptations of interaction networks, are an integral
part of everyday life, and it therefore seems natural to in-
corporate them into the framework of evolutionary game
theory in order to aid the evolution of cooperation.
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